### 1NC

#### 1NC A – Interpretation:

#### Topical affirmatives must affirm the resolution through instrumental defense of action by the United States Federal Government.

#### B – Definitions

#### Should denotes an expectation of enacting a plan

#### American Heritage Dictionary 2000 (Dictionary.com)

should. The will to do something or have something take place: I shall go out if I feel like it.

#### Federal government is the central government in Washington DC

Encarta Online 2005,

http://encarta.msn.com/encyclopedia\_1741500781\_6/United\_States\_(Government).html#howtocite

United States (Government), the combination of federal, state, and local laws, bodies, and agencies that is responsible for carrying out the operations of the United States. The federal government of the United States is centered in [Washington, D.C.](http://encarta.msn.com/encyclopedia_761576320/Washington_D_C.html)

#### Resolved implies a policy

Louisiana House 3-8-2005, <http://house.louisiana.gov/house-glossary.htm>

Resolution A legislative instrument that generally is used for making declarations, stating policies, and making decisions where some other form is not required. A bill includes the constitutionally required enacting clause; a resolution uses the term "resolved". Not subject to a time limit for introduction nor to governor's veto. ( Const. Art. III, §17(B) and House Rules 8.11 , 13.1 , 6.8 , and 7.4)

#### C – Vote neg –

#### First is Decisionmaking

#### The primary purpose of debate should be to improve our skills as decision-makers. We are all individual policy-makers who make choices every day that affect us and those around us. We have an obligation to the people affected by our decisions to use debate as a method for honing these critical thinking and information processing abilities.

Austin J. Freeley and David L. Steinberg – John Carroll University / U Miami – 2009, Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making, p. 1-4, googlebooks

After several days of intense debate, first the United States House of Representatives and then the U.S. Senate voted to authorize President George W. Bush to attack Iraq if Saddam Hussein refused to give up weapons of mass destruction as required by United Nations's resolutions. Debate about a possible military\* action against Iraq continued in various governmental bodies and in the public for six months, until President Bush ordered an attack on Baghdad, beginning Operation Iraqi Freedom, the military campaign against the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein. He did so despite the unwillingness of the U.N. Security Council to support the military action, and in the face of significant international opposition.¶ Meanwhile, and perhaps equally difficult for the parties involved, a young couple deliberated over whether they should purchase a large home to accommodate their growing family or should sacrifice living space to reside in an area with better public schools; elsewhere a college sophomore reconsidered his major and a senior her choice of law school, graduate school, or a job. Each of these\* situations called for decisions to be made. Each decision maker worked hard to make well-reasoned decisions.¶ Decision making is a thoughtful process of choosing among a variety of options for acting or thinking. It requires that the decider make a choice. Life demands decision making. We make countless individual decisions every day. To make some of those decisions, we work hard to employ care and consideration; others seem to just happen. Couples, families, groups of friends, and coworkers come together to make choices, and decision-making bodies from committees to juries to the U.S. Congress and the United Nations make decisions that impact us all. Every profession requires effective and ethical decision making, as do our school, community, and social organizations.¶ We all make many decisions every day. To refinance or sell one's home, to buy a high-performance SUV or an economical hybrid car. what major to select, what to have for dinner, what candidate to vote for, paper or plastic, all present us with choices. Should the president deal with an international crisis through military invasion or diplomacy? How should the U.S. Congress act to address illegal immigration?¶ Is the defendant guilty as accused? The Daily Show or the ball game? And upon what information should I rely to make my decision? Certainly some of these decisions are more consequential than others. Which amendment to vote for, what television program to watch, what course to take, which phone plan to purchase, and which diet to pursue all present unique challenges. At our best, we seek out research and data to inform our decisions. Yet even the choice of which information to attend to requires decision making. In 2006, TIME magazine named YOU its "Person of the Year." Congratulations! Its selection was based on the participation not of ''great men" in the creation of history, but rather on the contributions of a community of anonymous participants in the evolution of information. Through blogs. online networking. You Tube. Facebook, MySpace, Wikipedia, and many other "wikis," knowledge and "truth" are created from the bottom up, bypassing the authoritarian control of newspeople, academics, and publishers. We have access to infinite quantities of information, but how do we sort through it and select the best information for our needs?¶ The ability of every decision maker to make good, reasoned, and ethical decisions relies heavily upon their ability to think critically. Critical thinking enables one to break argumentation down to its component parts in order to evaluate its relative validity and strength. Critical thinkers are better users of information, as well as better advocates.¶ Colleges and universities expect their students to develop their critical thinking skills and may require students to take designated courses to that end. The importance and value of such study is widely recognized.¶ Much of the most significant communication of our lives is conducted in the form of debates. These may take place in intrapersonal communications, in which we weigh the pros and cons of an important decision in our own minds, or they may take place in interpersonal communications, in which we listen to arguments intended to influence our decision or participate in exchanges to influence the decisions of others.¶ Our success or failure in life is largely determined by our ability to make wise decisions for ourselves and to influence the decisions of others in ways that are beneficial to us. Much of our significant, purposeful activity is concerned with making decisions. Whether to join a campus organization, go to graduate school, accept a job oiler, buy a car or house, move to another city, invest in a certain stock, or vote for Garcia—these are just a few of the thousands of decisions we may have to make. Often, intelligent self-interest or a sense of responsibility will require us to win the support of others. We may want a scholarship or a particular job for ourselves, a customer for out product, or a vote for our favored political candidate.

#### Specifically, through discussing paths of government action, debate teaches us to be better organizational decision makers. Learning about the uniquely different considerations of organizations is necessary to affecting change in a world overwhelmingly dominated by institutions.

Algoso 2011 – Masters in Public Administration (May 31, Dave, “Why I got an MPA: Because organizations matter” <http://findwhatworks.wordpress.com/2011/05/31/why-i-got-an-mpa-because-organizations-matter/>)

Because organizations matter. Forget the stories of heroic individuals written in your middle school civics textbook. Nothing of great importance is ever accomplished by a single person. Thomas Edison had lab assistants, George Washington’s army had thousands of troops, and Mother Teresa’s Missionaries of Charity had over a million staff and volunteers when she passed away. Even Jesus had a 12-man posse. In different ways and in vastly different contexts, these were all organizations. Pick your favorite historical figure or contemporary hero, and I can almost guarantee that their greatest successes occurred as part of an organization. Even the most charismatic, visionary and inspiring leaders have to be able to manage people, or find someone who can do it for them. International development work is no different. Regardless of your issue of interest — whether private sector investment, rural development, basic health care, government capacity, girls’ education, or democracy promotion — your work will almost always involve operating within an organization. How well or poorly that organization functions will have dramatic implications for the results of your work. A well-run organization makes better decisions about staffing and operations; learns more from its mistakes; generates resources and commitment from external stakeholders; and structures itself to better promote its goals. None of this is easy or straightforward. We screw it up fairly often. Complaints about NGO management and government bureaucracy are not new. We all recognize the need for improvement. In my mind, the greatest challenges and constraints facing international development are managerial and organizational, rather than technical. Put another way: the greatest opportunities and leverage points lie in how we run our organizations. Yet our discourse about the international development industry focuses largely on how much money donors should commit to development and what technical solutions (e.g. deworming, elections, roads, whatever) deserve the funds. We give short shrift to the questions around how organizations can actually turn those funds into the technical solutions. The closest we come is to discuss the incentives facing organizations due to donor or political requirements. I think we can go deeper in addressing the management and organizational issues mentioned above. This thinking led me to an MPA degree because it straddles that space between organizations and issues. A degree in economics or international affairs could teach you all about the problems in the world, and you may even learn how to address them. But if you don’t learn how to operate in an organization, you may not be able to channel the resources needed to implement solutions. On the flip side, a typical degree in management offers relevant skills, but without the content knowledge necessary to understand the context and the issues. I think the MPA, if you choose the right program for you and use your time well, can do both.

#### Additionally, The best route to improving decision-making is through discussion about public policy

#### Mutually accessible information – There is a wide swath of literature on governmental policy topics – that ensures there will be informed, predictable, and in-depth debate over the aff’s decision. Individual policymaking is highly variable depending on the person and inaccessible to outsiders.

#### Harder decisions make better decisionmakers – The problems facing public policymakers are a magnitude greater than private decisions. We all know plans don’t actually happen, but practicing imagining the consequences of our decisions in the high-stakes games of public policymaking makes other decisionmaking easier.

#### External actors – the decisions we make should be analyzed not in a vacuum but in the complex social field that surrounds us

#### Second is Predictable Limits - The resolution proposes the question the negative is prepared to answer and creates a bounded list of potential affs for us to think about. Debate has unique potential to change attitudes and grow critical thinking skills because it forces pre-round internal deliberation on a of a focused, common ground of debate

Robert E. Goodin and Simon J. Niemeyer- Australian National University- 2003,

When Does Deliberation Begin? Internal Reflection versus Public Discussion in Deliberative Democracy, POLITICAL STUDIES: 2003 VOL 51, 627–649, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.0032-3217.2003.00450.x/pdf

What happened in this particular case, as in any particular case, was in some respects peculiar unto itself. The problem of the Bloomfield Track had been well known and much discussed in the local community for a long time. Exaggerated claims and counter-claims had become entrenched, and unreflective public opinion polarized around them. In this circumstance, the effect of the information phase of deliberative processes was to brush away those highly polarized attitudes, dispel the myths and symbolic posturing on both sides that had come to dominate the debate, and liberate people to act upon their attitudes toward the protection of rainforest itself. The key point, from the perspective of ‘democratic deliberation within’, is that that happened in the earlier stages of deliberation – before the formal discussions (‘deliberations’, in the discursive sense) of the jury process ever began. The simple process of jurors seeing the site for themselves, focusing their minds on the issues and listening to what experts had to say did virtually all the work in changing jurors’ attitudes. Talking among themselves, as a jury, did very little of it. However, the same might happen in cases very different from this one. Suppose that instead of highly polarized symbolic attitudes, what we have at the outset is mass ignorance or mass apathy or non-attitudes. There again, people’s engaging with the issue – focusing on it, acquiring information about it, thinking hard about it – would be something that is likely to occur earlier rather than later in the deliberative process. And more to our point, it is something that is most likely to occur within individuals themselves or in informal interactions, well in advance of any formal, organized group discussion. There is much in the large literature on attitudes and the mechanisms by which they change to support that speculation.31 Consider, for example, the literature on ‘central’ versus ‘peripheral’ routes to the formation of attitudes. Before deliberation, individuals may not have given the issue much thought or bothered to engage in an extensive process of reflection.32 In such cases, positions may be arrived at via peripheral routes, taking cognitive shortcuts or arriving at ‘top of the head’ conclusions or even simply following the lead of others believed to hold similar attitudes or values (Lupia, 1994). These shorthand approaches involve the use of available cues such as ‘expertness’ or ‘attractiveness’ (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986) – not deliberation in the internal-reflective sense we have described. Where peripheral shortcuts are employed, there may be inconsistencies in logic and the formation of positions, based on partial information or incomplete information processing. In contrast, ‘central’ routes to the development of attitudes involve the application of more deliberate effort to the matter at hand, in a way that is more akin to the internal-reflective deliberative ideal. Importantly for our thesis, there is nothing intrinsic to the ‘central’ route that requires group deliberation. Research in this area stresses instead the importance simply of ‘sufficient impetus’ for engaging in deliberation, such as when an individual is stimulated by personal involvement in the issue.33 The same is true of ‘on-line’ versus ‘memory-based’ processes of attitude change.34 The suggestion here is that we lead our ordinary lives largely on autopilot, doing routine things in routine ways without much thought or reflection. When we come across something ‘new’, we update our routines – our ‘running’ beliefs and pro cedures, attitudes and evaluations – accordingly. But having updated, we then drop the impetus for the update into deep-stored ‘memory’. A consequence of this procedure is that, when asked in the ordinary course of events ‘what we believe’ or ‘what attitude we take’ toward something, we easily retrieve what we think but we cannot so easily retrieve the reasons why. That more fully reasoned assessment – the sort of thing we have been calling internal-reflective deliberation – requires us to call up reasons from stored memory rather than just consulting our running on-line ‘summary judgments’. Crucially for our present discussion, once again, what prompts that shift from online to more deeply reflective deliberation is not necessarily interpersonal discussion. The impetus for fixing one’s attention on a topic, and retrieving reasons from stored memory, might come from any of a number sources: group discussion is only one. And again, even in the context of a group discussion, this shift from ‘online’ to ‘memory-based’ processing is likely to occur earlier rather than later in the process, often before the formal discussion ever begins. All this is simply to say that, on a great many models and in a great many different sorts of settings, it seems likely that elements of the pre-discursive process are likely to prove crucial to the shaping and reshaping of people’s attitudes in a citizens’ jury-style process. The initial processes of focusing attention on a topic, providing information about it and inviting people to think hard about it is likely to provide a strong impetus to internal-reflective deliberation, altering not just the information people have about the issue but also the way people process that information and hence (perhaps) what they think about the issue. What happens once people have shifted into this more internal-reflective mode is, obviously, an open question. Maybe people would then come to an easy consensus, as they did in their attitudes toward the Daintree rainforest.35 Or maybe people would come to divergent conclusions; and they then may (or may not) be open to argument and counter-argument, with talk actually changing minds. Our claim is not that group discussion will always matter as little as it did in our citizens’ jury.36 Our claim is instead merely that the earliest steps in the jury process – the sheer focusing of attention on the issue at hand and acquiring more information about it, and the internal-reflective deliberation that that prompts – will invariably matter more than deliberative democrats of a more discursive stripe would have us believe. However much or little difference formal group discussions might make, on any given occasion, the pre-discursive phases of the jury process will invariably have a considerable impact on changing the way jurors approach an issue. From Citizens’ Juries to Ordinary Mass Politics? In a citizens’ jury sort of setting, then, it seems that informal, pre-group deliberation – ‘deliberation within’ – will inevitably do much of the work that deliberative democrats ordinarily want to attribute to the more formal discursive processes. What are the preconditions for that happening? To what extent, in that sense, can findings about citizens’ juries be extended to other larger or less well-ordered deliberative settings? Even in citizens’ juries, deliberation will work only if people are attentive, open and willing to change their minds as appropriate. So, too, in mass politics. In citizens’ juries the need to participate (or **the anticipation of participating) in formally organized group discussions might be the ‘prompt’ that evokes those attributes**. But there might be many other possible ‘prompts’ that can be found in less formally structured mass-political settings. Here are a few ways citizens’ juries (and all cognate micro-deliberative processes)37 might be different from mass politics, and in which lessons drawn from that experience might not therefore carry over to ordinary politics: • A citizens’ jury concentrates people’s minds on a single issue. Ordinary politics involve many issues at once. • A citizens’ jury is often supplied a background briefing that has been agreed by all stakeholders (Smith and Wales, 2000, p. 58). In ordinary mass politics, there is rarely any equivalent common ground on which debates are conducted. • A citizens’ jury separates the process of acquiring information from that of discussing the issues. In ordinary mass politics, those processes are invariably intertwined. • A citizens’ jury is provided with a set of experts. They can be questioned, debated or discounted. But there is a strictly limited set of ‘competing experts’ on the same subject. In ordinary mass politics, claims and sources of expertise often seem virtually limitless, allowing for much greater ‘selective perception’. • Participating in something called a ‘citizens’ jury’ evokes certain very particular norms: norms concerning the ‘impartiality’ appropriate to jurors; norms concerning the ‘common good’ orientation appropriate to people in their capacity as citizens.38 There is a very different ethos at work in ordinary mass politics, which are typically driven by flagrantly partisan appeals to sectional interest (or utter disinterest and voter apathy). • In a citizens’ jury, **we think and listen in anticipation of the discussion phase, knowing that we soon will have to defend our views in a discursive setting where they will be probed intensively**.39 In ordinary mass-political settings, there is no such incentive for paying attention. It is perfectly true that citizens’ juries are ‘special’ in all those ways. But if being special in all those ways makes for a better – more ‘reflective’, more ‘deliberative’ – political process, then those are design features that we ought try to mimic as best we can in ordinary mass politics as well. There are various ways that that might be done. Briefing books might be prepared by sponsors of American presidential debates (the League of Women Voters, and such like) in consultation with the stakeholders involved. Agreed panels of experts might be questioned on prime-time television. Issues might be sequenced for debate and resolution, to avoid too much competition for people’s time and attention. Variations on the Ackerman and Fishkin (2002) proposal for a ‘deliberation day’ before every election might be generalized, with a day every few months being given over to small meetings in local schools to discuss public issues. All that is pretty visionary, perhaps. And (although it is clearly beyond the scope of the present paper to explore them in depth) there are doubtless many other more-or-less visionary ways of introducing into real-world politics analogues of the elements that induce citizens’ jurors to practice ‘democratic deliberation within’, even before the jury discussion gets underway. Here, we have to content ourselves with identifying those features that need to be replicated in real-world politics in order to achieve that goal – and with the ‘possibility theorem’ that is established by the fact that (as sketched immediately above) there is at least one possible way of doing that for each of those key features.

#### Third is Dogmatism – Most problems are not black and white but have complex, uncertain interactions. By declaring that \_\_\_\_\_ is always bad, they prevent us from understanding the nuances of an incredibly important and complex issue. This is the epitome of dogmatism

Keller, et. al,– Asst. professor School of Social Service Administration U. of Chicago - 2001

(Thomas E., James K., and Tracly K., Asst. professor School of Social Service Administration U. of Chicago, professor of Social Work, and doctoral student School of Social Work, “Student debates in policy courses: promoting policy practice skills and knowledge through active learning,” Journal of Social Work Education, Spr/Summer 2001, EBSCOhost)

John Dewey, the philosopher and educational reformer, suggested that the initial advance in the development of reflective thought occurs in the transition from holding fixed, static ideas to an attitude of doubt and questioning engendered by exposure to alternative views in social discourse (Baker, 1955, pp. 36-40). Doubt, confusion, and conflict resulting from discussion of diverse perspectives "force comparison, selection, and reformulation of ideas and meanings" (Baker, 1955, p. 45). Subsequent educational theorists have contended that learning requires openness to divergent ideas in combination with the ability to synthesize disparate views into a purposeful resolution (Kolb, 1984; Perry, 1970). On the one hand, clinging to the certainty of one's beliefs risks dogmatism, rigidity, and the inability to learn from new experiences. On the other hand, if one's opinion is altered by every new experience, the result is insecurity, paralysis, and the inability to take effective action. The educator's role is to help students develop the capacity to incorporate new and sometimes conflicting ideas and experiences into a coherent cognitive framework. Kolb suggests that, "if the education process begins by bringing out the learner's beliefs and theories, examining and testing them, and then integrating the new, more refined ideas in the person's belief systems, the learning process will be facilitated" (p. 28). The authors believe that involving students in substantive debates challenges them to learn and grow in the fashion described by Dewey and Kolb. Participation in a debate stimulates clarification and critical evaluation of the evidence, logic, and values underlying one's own policy position. In addition, to debate effectively students must understand and accurately evaluate the opposing perspective. The ensuing tension between two distinct but legitimate views is designed to yield a reevaluation and reconstruction of knowledge and beliefs pertaining to the issue.

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#### \*\*Cyber flexibility key to deterrence – failures spill over to all aspects of warfighting

Mowchan 11

John, Lieutenant Colonel, faculty at the Center for Strategic Leadership, US Army War College, career Army intelligence office, master’s degree in strategic intelligence from the National Intelligence University, US Naval Institute Editorial Board, “Don’t Draw the Red Line,” Proceedings Magazine, Oct, Vol 137, No 10/1304, http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2011-10/dont-draw-red-line

In a strategic environment that has become more volatile, complex, and uncertain, the United States increasingly relies on cyberspace to advance its national interests. Simultaneously, our adversaries, particularly nation states, are afforded more opportunities to undermine our efforts through their own nefarious activities in the digital domain. While not every act in coming years will pose an imminent threat to U.S. national security, economic well-being, or social stability, some will. Because of this, strategists, government leaders, and scholars frequently disagree over whether the United States should establish thresholds (or “red lines”) for responding to such hostile acts. Red-line proponents assert that thresholds can decrease the ambiguity of U.S. policies, bolster deterrence, and facilitate swift, decisive action.¶ Establishing cyber red lines, however, is folly. Given the evolving threat, current strategies, and the challenges of attribution in this domain, the United States is better served by not delineating them. Maintaining ambiguity on when and how U.S. instruments of national power will be used after a cyber attack gives government leaders the flexibility to tailor responses much as they would to threats in the other global domains.¶ Sources of Invisible Threats¶ To properly frame the issue, it is necessary to understand the evolving digital threat environment and current U.S. strategies. Hazards to national security and economic prosperity in cyberspace are multiplying. As the world becomes more interconnected, diverse state and non-state actors will have greater access and operational maneuverability to conduct malicious activities.¶ Sources of non-state cyber threats include, but are not limited to, hackers, “hacktivists,” terrorists, and organized crime groups. Hackers are generally thrill-seekers who regard accessing secure computer networks as a challenge. They usually don’t possess the technical skills to cause widespread, longstanding damage to computer networks; however, given the increasing availability of advanced tools, it is plausible that a skilled hacker could significantly disrupt critical U.S. information systems. Such a possibility becomes even more real if a nation state seeking to avoid attribution gives hackers the tools to disrupt or destroy critical networks.¶ For example, in early 2011, the computer security company McAfee, Inc., revealed that a Chinese hacker in Heze City, Shandong province, likely operating with external assistance, stole financial documents related to oil-and-gas-field exploration and operational details on data acquisition systems from five undisclosed Western multinational companies. The operation, known as Night Dragon, underscores how hackers can target not only the defense industrial base, government, and military computers, but global corporate and commercial targets. 1¶ By contrast, hacktivists use cyberspace to promote their political beliefs. While often focusing on propaganda, they can cause significant disruptions to computer networks, especially if technical or financial support is provided by external parties. For example, during the first 24 hours of the 2008 Russo-Georgian War, unidentified entities created a forum called StopGeorgia.ru, which contained target lists, links to advanced malware, and expert advice on attacking critical Georgian information systems. 2 No evidence linked the Russian government or military to this forum; however, its timing and Russia’s purported advanced digital capabilities suggest there could at least have been an indirect tie.¶ With the proliferation of technologies, terrorist organizations such as al Qaeda also could cause catastrophic damage. According to Deputy Secretary of Defense William J. Lynn, “The greatest concern . . . is a terrorist group that gains the level of disruptive and destructive capability currently possessed by nation states.” 3 For example, in 2010 a terrorism suspect with links to al Qaeda acknowledged that the latter had conducted offensive operations that included denial-of-service attacks against the Israeli prime minister’s computer server. 4¶ Organized crime groups penetrate computer networks to steal money and trade secrets or financial information. There is evidence that Central European crime groups have defrauded U.S. citizens and businesses of approximately $1 billion and as much as $1 trillion on a global scale in the past year. 5 More ominous, crime groups have also attempted to acquire sensitive U.S. defense-related information, which could then be sold on the black market to our adversaries.¶ Foreign Intelligence Networks¶ While nonstate actors may constitute the greatest threat, nation states have the necessary resources to acquire the most advanced technologies. Currently more than 100 foreign national intelligence organizations conduct operations, many of which target U.S. computer networks. 6 These organizations likely employ proxies to hide the identity of the responsible state. The most sophisticated threats originate in Russia and China, which continue to make significant advancements in their capabilities.¶ In May, China’s defense minister announced the existence of an elite People’s Liberation Army cyber unit called the Blue Army. 7 While this unit’s mission is “cyber defense,” conducting offensive operations is but a keystroke away. And last year, Russia’s director of the Institute of Information Security Issues at Moscow State University (also a member of Russia’s National Security Council) admitted the nation is developing offensive cyber capabilities. 8¶ The extent of this activity leads to several key conclusions. First, nation states pose the greatest threat to U.S. computer networks. China and Russia, for instance, can conduct a full range of hostile actions, from web-page defacements and espionage to deploying malicious software that can disrupt or destroy computer networks operating critical U.S. information systems. Second, cyberspace affords anonymity, masking both perpetrator and motive. Third, relative ease of access and the proliferation of advanced information technologies allow almost anyone to cause significant damage to U.S. computer networks. Finally, the lines differentiating the sources of these threats—nation state, criminal organization, or terrorists—are becoming increasingly blurred, rendering the appropriate response highly problematic.¶ Evolving U.S. Policies¶ The United States recently released two national strategies for operating in the digital domain: the International Strategy for Cyberspace (ISC) and the Department of Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace (DSOC). The ISC is a landmark policy document intended to “promote an open, interoperable, secure, and reliable information and communications infrastructure that supports international trade and commerce, strengthens international security, and fosters free expression and innovation.” 9 While the document emphasizes diplomacy and development, defense plays a critical role, especially as it pertains to this domain. The ISC states:¶ When warranted, the United States will respond to hostile acts in cyberspace as we would to any other threat to our country. All states possess an inherent right to self-defense, and we recognize that certain hostile acts conducted through cyberspace could compel actions under the commitments we have with our military treaty partners. We reserve the right to use all necessary means—diplomatic, informational, military, and economic—as appropriate and consistent with applicable international law, in order to defend our Nation, our allies, our partners, and our interests. In so doing, we will exhaust all options before military force whenever we can; will carefully weigh the costs and risks of action against the costs of inaction; and will act in a way that reflects our values and strengthens our legitimacy, seeking broad international support whenever possible. 10¶ DOD followed with the DSOC, which acknowledges that such hostile operations will be prominent in any future conflict involving state or non-state actors. It outlines five strategic initiatives:¶ • Treat cyberspace as an operational domain to organize, train, and equip so that DOD can take full advantage of its potential.¶ • Employ new defense operating concepts to protect DOD networks and systems.¶ • Partner with other U.S. government departments, agencies, and the private sector.¶ • Build sound relationships with U.S. allies and international partners to strengthen collective security.¶ • Leverage the nation’s ingenuity through an exceptional workforce and rapid technological innovation. 11¶ While DOD’s strategy is defensive in nature, it states that U.S. military power will be used if necessary: “The Department will work with interagency and international partners to encourage responsible behavior and oppose those who would seek to disrupt networks and systems, dissuade and deter malicious actors, and reserve the right to defend these vital national assets as necessary and appropriate.” 12¶ Both plans lead to several key observations. First, the ISC and DSOC are intentionally ambiguous. Neither defines a hostile act in cyberspace, nor is there language explicitly stating when, how, and to what extent the United States will respond to such acts. Second, both strategies acknowledge that there are no simple solutions to the challenges of the day. Finally, decisions will continue to be shaped by the dynamic interplay of a surfeit of political, economic, military, and social variables in the international environment, and because the world is more “gray” than black-and-white, responses to hostile acts in the digital domain will be determined as strategic responses are in conventional warfare.¶ The Case for Thresholds¶ Red-line advocates believe that creating thresholds will decrease the ambiguity of our policies, bolster deterrence, and facilitate a more timely response. Some pundits criticize the ISC and DSOC, arguing they take ambiguity too far. The DSOC in particular, they think, should outline response thresholds that if crossed, would result in diplomatic or military retaliation. Following the release of DOD’s strategy, Representative Jim Langevin (D-RI) acknowledged the DSOC represented a good start but said it was deficient in several key areas, including its fixation on defense and the identification of acceptable red lines. 13¶ After the DSOC was published, now-retired Marine Corps General James Cartwright, the former vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, remarked that the strategy was too defensive, stating “we are supposed to be offshore convincing people if they attack, it won’t be free . . . [and that] disabling computerized patient records at a hospital such that the patients cannot be treated would be a violation of the law of armed conflict [which could] then [trigger a] proportional response.” 14 General Cartwright went on to emphasize the nation will need stronger deterrents. Although he did not say what the deterrents should be or what instruments of national power would be used, his words lend support to red-line advocates who demand greater specificity in U.S. policies, greater clarity on what constitutes a hostile act, and clear thresholds.¶ Why Ambiguity Is Good¶ Those arguing for establishing red lines fail to comprehend the complexity of the digital domain, in which adaptation and anonymity are the norm. The United States is better served in the long run by not establishing such thresholds, for four reasons. First, not doing so allows government leaders the latitude to tailor response options based on a hostile act, its physical and digital effects, and how it relates to the current state of affairs in the international system. As retired Air Force General Kevin Chilton remarked in 2009 as commander, U.S. Strategic Command, “I don’t think you take anything off the table when you provide [response] options to the president to decide. Why would we constrain ourselves on how we would respond [to hostile acts in cyberspace]?” 15¶ Such an approach does not differ from the way the United States addresses hostile acts in other domains. If red lines are established, we will be compelled to respond to each threat that crosses the line, which is unrealistic, given that our computer networks are subjected to millions of probes, scans, and attacks on a daily basis. Even if red lines are narrowly focused (e.g., employing military force if a cyber attack results in the deaths of U.S. citizens), the first time the United States fails to respond accordingly, it will undermine the credibility and deterrence effect of our other capabilities.¶ A second reason in favor of ambiguity is that if our adversaries know our response to such acts, they will adjust accordingly. Because neither the national nor the defense strategy explicitly defines a hostile act in cyberspace or exactly how the United States will respond, this leaves it open to interpretation. As one military official remarked, “If you shut down our power grid, maybe we will put a missile down one of your smokestacks.” 16 In addition, hostile actors may perceive a green light for certain acts that do not cross a particular response threshold. While one such act below this threshold may not be harmful to U.S. interests, what if 100 million are? Again, maintaining ambiguity concerning when, how, and to what extent to respond gives the United States greater latitude.¶ Third, because cyberspace is a global domain that emphasizes open access, the free flow of information, and anonymity, it is extremely difficult to determine where the threat or attack originated. For example, U.S. military networks are probed more than six million times a day by assailants operating in one corner of the world using computer networks or servers in another corner. Most perpetrators are never identified, except for a computer Internet protocol address or a one-time user alias. Army General Keith Alexander, commander of U.S. Cyber Command and Director, National Security Agency, emphasized this challenge, saying, “Too often, the military discovers through forensics that network probes have been successful [and] as a consequence, response becomes policing up after the fact versus mitigating it real time.” 17 If red lines demand a timely response and there is no one to pin responsibility on, then how can a response be implemented?¶ Finally, even if the source of the attacks is determined in a timely manner, automatic triggers for a response, particularly those that employ military force, could create negative second- and third-order effects that make a bad situation even worse. Given that nation states pose the greatest threat to U.S. networks, red lines that automatically result in a response could escalate an already volatile situation.¶ For example, in 2009 individuals in China and Russia penetrated computer networks operating parts of the U.S. electrical power grid. 18 They reportedly inserted malware that could destroy infrastructure components. Although their identities or associations with the Russian and Chinese governments were not disclosed, it validates the point that response options must be tailored. If Russia or China, two nuclear powers, were responsible, a U.S. response would be markedly different than if they had they been conducted by a non-nuclear state. Clearly the diplomatic, information, and economic instruments of national power versus military force would receive more emphasis with China or Russia for what could be considered a hostile act in cyberspace.¶ Given the complex and indeterminate 21st century international system and the multitude of current threats, U.S. interests will be better served by not establishing clear thresholds. Ambiguity is a powerful tool to shape our adversaries’ actions in all domains and allows us the maneuverability to respond where, when, and how we choose. Red-line advocates must understand that thresholds only constrain our actions and could undermine credibility and the power to effectively deter our adversaries.

#### Loss of warfighting effectiveness ensures nuclear war in every hotspot

Kagan and O’Hanlon 07, resident scholar at AEI and senior fellow in foreign policy at Brookings

(Frederick and Michael, The Case for Larger Ground Forces, April, http://www.aei.org/files/2007/04/24/20070424\_Kagan20070424.pdf)

We live at a time when **wars not only rage in nearly every region but threaten to erupt in many places where the current relative calm is** tenuous. To view this as **a strategic military challenge for the U**nited **S**tates **is not to espouse a specific theory of America’s role in the world** or a certain political philosophy. Such an assessment flows directly from the basic bipartisan view of American foreign policy makers since World War II that **overseas threats must be countered before they can directly threaten this country’s shores**, that the **basic stability of the international system is essential to American peace** and prosperity, **and that no country besides the U**nited **S**tates **is in a position to lead the way in countering major challenges to the global order**. Let us highlight the **threats and their consequences** with a few concrete examples, emphasizing those **that involve key strategic regions of the world such as the Persian Gulf and East Asia, or** key potential **threats to American security, such as the spread of nuclear weapons and** the strengthening of the global **Al Qaeda**/jihadist movement. The Iranian government has rejected a series of international demands to halt its efforts at enriching uranium and submit to international inspections. What will happen if the US—or Israeli—government becomes convinced that Tehran is on the verge of fielding a nuclear weapon? North **Korea**, of course, has already done so, and the ripple effects are beginning to spread. Japan’s recent election to supreme power of a leader who has promised to rewrite that country’s constitution to support increased armed forces—and, possibly, even nuclear weapons— may well alter the delicate balance of fear in Northeast Asia fundamentally and rapidly. Also, in the background, at least for now, Sino Taiwanese tensions continue to flare, as do tensions between India and Pakistan, Pakistan and Afghanistan, Venezuela and the United States, and so on. Meanwhile, the world’s nonintervention in Darfur troubles consciences from Europe to America’s Bible Belt to its bastions of liberalism, yet with no serious international forces on offer, the bloodletting will probably, tragically, continue unabated. And as bad as things are in Iraq today, they could get worse. What would happen if the key Shiite figure, Ali al Sistani, were to die? If another major attack on the scale of the Golden Mosque bombing hit either side (or, perhaps, both sides at the same time)? Such deterioration might convince many Americans that the war there truly was lost—but the costs of reaching such a conclusion would be enormous. Afghanistan is somewhat more stable for the moment, although a major Taliban offensive appears to be in the offing. Sound US grand strategy must proceed from the recognition that, over the next few years and decades, the world is going to be a very unsettled and quite dangerous place, with Al Qaeda and its associated groups as a subset of a much larger set of worries. The only serious response to this international environment is to develop armed forces capable of protecting America’s vital interests throughout this dangerous time**.** Doing so requires a military capable of a wide range of missions—including not only deterrence of great power conflict in dealing with potential hotspots in Korea, the Taiwan Strait, and the Persian Gulf but also associated with a variety of Special Forces activities and stabilization operations. For today’s US military, which already excels at high technology and is increasingly focused on re-learning the lost art of counterinsurgency, this is first and foremost a question of finding the resources to field a large-enough standing Army and Marine Corps to handle personnel intensive missions such as the ones now under way in Iraq and Afghanistan.

### 1NC

#### We advocate the entirety of the 1AC except for their use of the name Bradley Manning and masculine pronouns.

#### Referring to Chelsea Manning as “he” or “Bradley” is insulting and discriminatory – their reference disrespects transgendered people and reinforces heteronormativity.

Krehely 13

Jeff, VP and Chief Foundation Officer, Human Rights Campaign, “Pvt. Chelsea E. Manning Comes Out, Deserves Respectful Treatment by Media and Officials,” Aug 22, http://www.hrc.org/blog/entry/pvt.-chelsea-e.-manning-comes-out-deserves-respectful-treatment-by-media-an

Regardless of how she came to our attention, Pvt. Chelsea Manning’s transition deserves to be treated with dignity and respect. As she requested in her letter, journalists and other officials should use her chosen name of Chelsea and refer to her with female pronouns. Using the name Bradley or male pronouns is nothing short of an insult. Media, having reported on her wishes, must respect them as is the standard followed by the AP Stylebook.¶ As Pvt. Manning serves her sentence, she deserves the same thing that any incarcerated person does – appropriate and competent medical care and protection from discrimination and violence. The care she receives should be something that she and her doctors – including professionals who understand transgender care – agree is best for her. There is a clear legal consensus that it is the government’s responsibility to provide medically necessary care for transgender people and the military has an obligation to follow those guidelines.¶ What should not be lost is that there are transgender servicemembers and veterans who serve and have served this nation with honor, distinction and great sacrifice. We must not forget or dishonor those individuals. Pvt. Manning’s experience is not a proxy for any other transgender man or woman who wears the uniform of the United States.

**Heteronormativity results in omnicide. The combination of the universal suspicion of queerness and the genocidal impulse to eradicate it motivates a larger apocalyptic movement to rescue hetero-culture with extinction.**

Sedgwick 8 (Eve, Professor of English at Duke University, *Epistemology of the Closet*, second revised edition, California at Berkeley Press, p. 127-130)

From at least the biblical story of Sodom and Gomorrah, scenarios of same-sex desire would seem to have had a privileged, though by no means an exclusive, relation in Western culture to scenarios of both genocide and omnicide. That sodomy, the name by which homosexual acts are known even today to the law of half of the United States and to the Supreme Court of all of them, should already be inscribed with the name of a site of mass extermination is the appropriate trace of a double history. In the first place there is a history of the mortal suppression, legal or subjudicial, of gay acts and gay people, through burning, hounding, physical and chemical castration, concentration camps, bashing—the array of sanctioned fatalities that Louis Crompton records under the name of gay genocide, and whose supposed eugenic motive becomes only the more colorable with the emergence of a distinct, naturalized minority identity in the nineteenth century. In the second place, though, there is the inveterate topos of associating gay acts or persons with fatalities vastly broader than their own extent: if it is ambiguous whether every denizen of the obliterated Sodom was a sodomite, clearly not every Roman of the late Empire can have been so, despite Gibbon's connecting the eclipse of the whole people to the habits of a few. Following both Gibbon and the Bible, moreover, with an impetus borrowed from Darwin, one of the few areas of agreement among modern Marxist, Nazi, and liberal capitalist ideologies is that there is a peculiarly close, though never precisely defined, affinity between same-sex desire and some historical condition of moribundity, called "decadence," to which not individuals or minorities but whole civilizations are subject. Bloodletting on a scale more massive by orders of magnitude than any gay minority presence in the culture is the "cure," if cure there be, to the mortal illness of decadence. If a fantasy trajectory, utopian in its own terms, toward gay genocide has been endemic in Western culture from its origins, then, it may also have been true that the trajectory toward gay genocide was never clearly distinguishable from a broader, apocalyptic trajectory toward something approaching omnicide. The deadlock of the past century between minoritizing and universalizing understandings of homo/heterosexual definition can only have deepened this fatal bond in the heterosexist imaginaire. In our culture as in Billy Budd, the phobic narrative trajectory toward imagining a time after the homosexual is finally inseparable from that toward imagining a time after the human; in the wake of the homosexual, the wake incessantly produced since first there were homosexuals, every human relation is pulled into its shining representational furrow. Fragments of visions of a time after the homosexual are, of course, currently in dizzying circulation in our culture. One of the many dangerous ways that AIDS discourse seems to ratify and amplify preinscribed homophobic mythologies is in its pseudo-evolutionary presentation of male homosexuality as a stage doomed to extinction (read, a phase the species is going through) on the enormous scale of whole populations. 26 The lineaments of openly genocidal malice behind this fantasy appear only occasionally in the respectable media, though they can be glimpsed even there behind the poker-face mask of our national experiment in laissez-faire medicine. A better, if still deodorized, whiff of that malice comes from the famous pronouncement of Pat Robertson: "AIDS is God's way of weeding his garden." The saccharine luster this dictum gives to its vision of devastation, and the ruthless prurience with which it misattributes its own agency, cover a more fundamental contradiction: that, to rationalize complacent glee at a spectacle of what is imagined as genocide, a proto-Darwinian process of natural selection is being invoked—in the context of a Christian fundamentalism that is not only antievolutionist but recklessly oriented toward universal apocalypse. A similar phenomenon, also too terrible to be noted as a mere irony, is how evenly our culture's phobia about HIV-positive blood is kept pace with by its rage for keeping that dangerous blood in broad, continuous circulation. This is evidenced in projects for universal testing, and in the needle-sharing implicit in William Buckley's now ineradicable fantasy of tattooing HIV-positive persons. But most immediately and pervasively it is evidenced in the literal bloodbaths that seem to make the point of the AIDS-related resurgence in violent bashings of gays--which, unlike the gun violence otherwise ubiquitous in this culture, are characteristically done with two-by-fours, baseball bats, and fists, in the most literal-minded conceivable form of body-fluid contact. It might be worth making explicit that the use of evolutionary thinking in the current wave of utopian/genocidal fantasy is, whatever else it may be, crazy. Unless one believes, first of all, that same-sex object-choice across history and across cultures is one thing with one cause, and, second, that its one cause is direct transmission through a nonrecessive genetic path--which would be, to put it gently, counter-intuitive--there is no warrant for imagining that gay populations, even of men, in post-AIDS generations will be in the slightest degree diminished. Exactly to the degree that AIDS is a gay disease, it's a tragedy confined to our generation; the long-term demographic depredations of the disease will fall, to the contrary, on groups, many themselves direly endangered, that are reproduced by direct heterosexual transmission. Unlike genocide directed against Jews, Native Americans, Africans, or other groups, then, gay genocide, the once-and-for-all eradication of gay populations, however potent and sustained as a project or fantasy of modern Western culture, is not possible short of the eradication of the whole human species. The impulse of the species toward its own eradication must not either, however, be underestimated. Neither must the profundity with which that omnicidal impulse is entangled with the modern problematic of the homosexual: the double bind of definition between the homosexual, say, as a distinct risk group, and the homosexual as a potential of representation within the universal. 27 As gay community and the solidarity and visibility of gays as a minority population are being consolidated and tempered in the forge of this specularized terror and suffering, how can it fail to be all the more necessary that the avenues of recognition, desire, and thought between minority potentials and universalizing ones be opened and opened and opened?

Interrogating discursive formations of heteronormativity is critical to resist dominant power structures – individual use of language matters.

Bevir 99 (Mark Bevir, Professor of PoliSci @ UC Berkeley, “Foucault and Critique: Deploying Agency Against Autonomy”, Political Theory, 1/1/99, http://escholarship.org/uc/item/5th397ks)

To begin, therefore, let us look at power/knowledge and its role in constructing¶ the subject. Foucault postulates a historical series of regimes of power/knowledge, all¶ of which are incommensurable with one another, and each of which sustains a¶ different type of subjectivity. All knowledge arises out of a power complex: regimes¶ of power define what counts as a meaningful utterance, what topics are to be¶ investigated, how facts are to be produced, and the like. Equally, however, all regimes of power are constituted by discursive formations: regimes of knowledge¶ define who does and who does not have the intellectual authority to decide issues,¶ how information should be gathered about who and by who, and the like. Power and¶ knowledge always imply one another: they interpenetrate within specific regimes that¶ provide the modes of subjection, and also liberation, through which subjects constitute¶ themselves. Foucault argues that ideas such as subjectivity, personality, and the soul¶ are just part of a specific discursive formation produced by the operation of a specific¶ power complex on the body. Here one can see Foucault's Discipline and Punish as an¶ attempt to analyse the way power works on the body through external controls, and his¶ History of Sexuality as an attempt to analyse the way it does so through internal¶ controls. The former work looks at the rise of the modern system of surveillance in¶ prisons, schools, factories, hospitals, and so on.7 Modern power relies on constant¶ supervision and control of individuals in accord with a certain concept of normality.¶ The later work looks at the extension of a confessional technology of the self from a¶ religious domain to social life as a whole.8 Individuals police themselves by¶ examining, confessing, and regulating their own thoughts and behaviour in accord¶ with a certain concept of normality. Even if Foucault sometimes appears to put too¶ much emphasis on the body at the expense of things such as the law, the crux of his¶ position is clear: society, conceived as a specific regime of power/knowledge, defines¶ the subject, conceived in terms of both the norms by which we try to live and the¶ techniques by which we try to ensure we do so. The individual is the arbitrary¶ construct of a social formation. Society gives us the values and practices by which we¶ live.

### Util

#### Hacktivism declining and ineffectual in the squo

Rose 13 (Andrew, a policy analyst for Forrester Research, “Hactivism: how worried should organisations be?”, The Guardian, <http://www.theguardian.com/media-network/media-network-blog/2013/jun/27/hactivism-how-worried-organisations>, accessed October 19, 2013)

In 2013, however, things look a little different. Hacktivist groups have suffered from a string of convictions as frustrated governments clamped down on their activity. Attacks seems to have lessened as confirmed by the recent Verizon data breach report, which tracks security incidents across the globe. It stated that only a small minority of attacks have hacktivist roots, and that the vast majority of data security threats now originate from organised criminal and state sponsored groups. The distributed and individualised nature of this movement mean that the groups have no common background or goal and this can lead to a level of inconsistency and randomness that would befuddle most CEOs. Lacking a nominated leader, the hacktivist movement relies on clear causes to unite and focus their activities – when these causes are not so clear, the group tends to fragment and seek out other activities.

[read this next part IF you have time]

One drawback of this decentralised and leaderless structure is that it can be subverted and used by other parties for their own gain. Criminals may leverage the hacktivist brand to obfuscate their activities and groups appear which push government propaganda under the auspices of representing the people and freedom of speech. The hacktivist's signature distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack, for example, is increasingly being seen as a smokescreen to divert an organisation's attention while a deeper infiltration attempt is made.

#### Failing to prevent a horrible outcome is just as bad as causing it – the aff is moral evasion

Nielsen – philosophy prof, Calgary - 93

Kai Nielsen, Professor of Philosophy, University of Calgary, Absolutism and Its Consequentialist Critics, ed. Joram Graf Haber, 1993, p. 170-2

Forget the levity of the example and consider the case of the innocent fat man. If there really is no other way of unsticking our fat man and if plainly, without blasting him out, everyone in the cave will drown, then, innocent or not, he should be blasted out. This indeed overrides the principle that the innocent should never be deliberately killed, but it does not reveal a callousness toward life, for the people involved are caught in a desperate situation in which, if such extreme action is not taken, many lives will be lost and far greater misery will obtain. Moreover, the people who do such a horrible thing or acquiesce in the doing of it are not likely to be rendered more callous about human life and human suffering as a result. Its occurrence will haunt them for the rest of their lives and is as likely as not to make them more rather than less morally sensitive. It is not even correct to say that such a desperate act shows a lack of respect for persons. We are not treating the fat man merely as a means. The fat man's person‑his interests and rights are not ignored. Killing him is something which is undertaken with the greatest reluctance. It is only when it is quite certain that there is no other way to save the lives of the others that such a violent course of action is justifiably undertaken. Alan Donagan, arguing rather as Anscombe argues, maintains that "to use any innocent man ill for the sake of some public good is directly to degrade him to being a mere means" and to do this is of course to violate a principle essential to morality, that is, that human beings should never merely be treated as means but should be treated as ends in themselves (as persons worthy of respect)." But, as my above remarks show, it need not be the case, and in the above situation it is not the case, that in killing such an innocent man we are treating him merely as a means. The action is universalizable, all alternative actions which would save his life are duly considered, the blasting out is done only as a last and desperate resort with the minimum of harshness and indifference to his suffering and the like. It indeed sounds ironical to talk this way, given what is done to him. But if such a terrible situation were to arise, there would always be more or less humane ways of going about one's grim task. And in acting in the more humane ways toward the fat man, as we do what we must do and would have done to ourselves were the roles reversed, we show a respect for his person. In so treating the fat man‑not just to further the public good but to prevent the certain death of a whole group of people (that is to prevent an even greater evil than his being killed in this way)‑the claims of justice are not overriden either, for each individual involved, if he is reasonably correct, should realize that if he were so stuck rather than the fat man, he should in such situations be blasted out. Thus, there is no question of being unfair. Surely we must choose between evils here, but is there anything more reasonable, more morally appropriate, than choosing the lesser evil when doing or allowing some evil cannot be avoided? That is, where there is no avoiding both and where our actions can determine whether a greater or lesser evil obtains, should we not plainly always opt for the lesser evil? And is it not obviously a greater evil that all those other innocent people should suffer and die than that the fat man should suffer and die? Blowing up the fat man is indeed monstrous. But letting him remain stuck while the whole group drowns is still more monstrous. The consequentialist is on strong moral ground here, and, if his reflective moral convictions do not square either with certain unrehearsed or with certain reflective particular moral convictions of human beings, so much the worse for such commonsense moral convictions. One could even usefully and relevantly adapt herethough for a quite different purpose‑an argument of Donagan's. Consequentialism of the kind I have been arguing for provides so persuasive "a theoretical basis for common morality that when it contradicts some moral intuition, it is natural to suspect that intuition, not theory, is corrupt."" Given the comprehensiveness, plausibility, and overall rationality of consequentialism, it is not unreasonable to override even a deeply felt moral conviction if it does not square with such a theory, though, if it made no sense or overrode the bulk of or even a great many of our considered moral convictions, that would be another matter indeed. Anticonsequentialists often point to the inhumanity of people who will sanction such killing of the innocent, but cannot the compliment be returned by speaking of the even greater inhumanity, conjoined with evasiveness, of those who will allow even more death and far greater misery and then excuse themselves on the ground that they did not intend the death and misery but merely forbore to prevent it? In such a context, such reasoning and such forbearing to prevent seems to me to constitute a moral evasion. I say it is evasive because rather than steeling himself to do what in normal circumstances would be a horrible and vile act but in this circumstance is a harsh moral necessity, he allows, when he has the power to prevent it, a situation which is still many times worse. He tries to keep his `moral purity' and avoid `dirty hands' at the price of utter moral failure and what Kierkegaard called `double‑mindedness.' It is understandable that people should act in this morally evasive way but this does not make it right.

#### Voting neg doesn’t necessitate absolute utilitarianism – there is a high threshold past which we should compromise morals to avoid catastrophic consequences

Moore – law prof, U San Diego – ‘97

Michael Moore, Warren Distinguished Professor of Law at University of San Diego School of Law, 1997, Placing Blame, p. 719-722

Non-Absolute Moral Norms: Threshold Deontology Apart from the exceptions that the content of moral norms must have for them to be plausible, a third modification of absolutism is the softening of the ‘whatever the consequences’ aspect mentioned earlier. This aspect of absolutism is often attributed to Kant, who held that though the heavens may fall, justice must be done. Despite my non­consequentialist views on morality, I cannot accept the Kantian line. It just is not true that one should allow a nuclear war rather than killing or torturing an innocent person. It is not even true that one should allow the destruction of a sizable city by a terrorist nuclear device rather than kill or torture an innocent person. To prevent such extraordinary harms extreme actions seem to me to be justified. There is a story in the Talmudic sources that may appear to appeal to a contrary intuition.122 It is said that where the city is sur­rounded and threatened with destruction if it does not send out one of its inhabitants to be killed, it is better that the whole city should perish rather than become an accomplice to the killing of one of its inhabitants. Benjamin Cardozo expressed the same intuition in rejecting the idea that those in a lifeboat about to sink and drown may jettison enough of their number to allow the remainder to stay afloat. As Cardozo put it: Where two or more are overtaken by a common disaster, there is no right on the part of one to save the lives of some by the killing of another. There is no rule of human jettison. Men there will often be who, when told that their going will be the salvation of the remnant, will choose the nobler part and make the plunge into the waters. In that supreme moment the dark­ness for them will be illumined by the thought that those behind will ride to safety. If none of such mold are found aboard the boat, or too few to save the others, the human freight must be left to meet the chances of the waters. 123 There is admittedly a nobility when those who are threatened with destruction choose on their own to suffer that destruction rather than participate in a prima facie immoral act. But what happens when we eliminate the choice of all concerned to sacrifice them­selves? Alter the Talmudic example slightly by making it the ruler of the city who alone must decide whether to send one out in order to prevent destruction of the city. Or take the actual facts of the lifeboat case’24 to which Cardozo was adverting, where it was a sea­man who took charge of the sinking lifeboat and jettisoned enough of its passengers to save the rest. Or consider Bernard Williams’s example, where you come across a large group of villagers about to be shot by the army as an example to others, and you can save most of them if you will but shoot one; far from choosing to ‘sink or swim’ together, the villagers beg you to shoot one of their number so that the rest may be saved.125 In all such cases it no longer seems virtuous to refuse to do an act that you abhor. On the contrary, it seems a narcissistic preoccupation with your own ‘virtue’—that is, the ‘virtue’ you could have if the world were ideal and did not pre­sent you with such awful choices—if you choose to allow the greater number to perish. In such cases, I prefer Sartre’s version of the Orestes legend to the Talmud: the ruler should take the guilt upon himself rather than allow his people to perish.’26One should feel guilty **in such cases,** but it is nobler to undertake such guilt than to shut one’s eyes to the horrendous consequences of not acting. I thus have some sympathy for the Landau Commission’s conclusion that ‘actual torture . . . would perhaps be justified in order to uncover a bomb about to explode in a building full of people’. If one does not know which building is going to explode, one does not have the consent of all concerned to ‘sink or swim’ together. On the contrary, one suspects that like Williams’s villagers, the occupants of the building, if they knew of their danger, would choose that one of their number (to say nothing of one of the ter­rorist group) be tortured or die to prevent the loss of all. In any case, the GSS interrogator must choose for others who will pay the costs for his decision if he decides not to act, a cost he does not have to bear; this situation is thus more like my variation of the Talmudic example than the original. Many think that the agent-relative view just sketched, allowing as it does consequences to override moral absolutes when those consequences are horrendous enough, collapses into a consequen­tialist morality after all. Glanville Williams, for example, in his discussion of the legal defence of necessity, recognizes the agent-relative view that ‘certain actions are right or wrong irrespective of their consequences’ and that ‘a good end never justifies bad means’. Williams nonetheless concludes that ‘in the last resort moral decisions must be made with reference to results’. Williams reaches this conclusion because, as Williams sees it, the agent-relative slogans just quoted reduce to the claim ‘that we ought to do what is right regardless of the consequences, as long as the consequences are not serious’. Contrary to Williams, there is no collapse of agent-relative views into consequentialism just because morality’s norms can be over­ridden by horrendous consequences.13’ A consequentialist is com­mitted by her moral theory to saying that torture of one person is justified whenever it is necessary to prevent the torture of two or more. The agent-relative view, even as here modified, is not com­mitted to this proposition. To justify torturing one innocent person requires that there be horrendous consequences attached to not tor­turing that person—the destruction of an entire city, or, perhaps, of a lifeboat or building full of people. On this view, in other words, there is a very high threshold of bad consequences that must be threatened before something as awful as torturing an innocent per­son can be justified. Almost all real-life decisions a GSS interroga­tor will face—and perhaps all decisions—will not reach that threshold of horrendous consequences justifying torture of the innocent. Short of such a threshold, the agent-relative view just sketched will operate as absolutely as absolutism in its ban on tor­turing the innocent.

#### Must choose the lesser evil - Not all situations have a moral solution

Thomas Nagel, Professor of Philosophy, New York University, Absolutism and Its Consequentialist Critics, ed. Joram Graf Haber, 1993, p. 234-5

Having described the elements of the absolutist position, we must now return to the conflict between it and utilitarianism. Even if certain types of dirty tactics become acceptable when the stakes are high enough, the most serious of the prohibited acts, like murder and torture, are not just supposed to require unusually strong justification. They are supposed never to be done, because no quantity of resulting benefit is thought capable of justifying such treatment of a person. The fact remains that when an absolutist knows or believes that the utilitarian cost of refusing to adopt a prohibited course will be very high, he may hold to his refusal to adopt it, but he will find it difficult to feel that a moral dilemma has been satisfactorily resolved. The same may be true of someone who rejects an absolutist requirement and adopts instead the course yielding the most acceptable consequences. In either case, it is possible to feel that one has acted for reasons insufficient to justify violation of the opposing principle. In situations of deadly conflict, particularly where a weaker party is threatened with annihilation or enslavement by a stronger one, the argument for resorting to atrocities can be powerful, and the dilemma acute. There may exist principles, not yet codified, which would enable us to resolve such dilemmas. But then again there may not. We must face the pessimistic alternative that these two forms of moral intuition are not capable of being brought together into a single, coherent moral system, and that the world can present us with situations in which there is no honorable or moral course for a man to take, no course free of guilt and responsibility for evil." The idea of a moral blind alley is a perfectly intelligible one. It is possible to get into such a situation by one's own fault, and people do it all the time. If, for example, one makes two incompatible promises or commitments‑becomes engaged to two people, for example‑then there is no course one can take which is not wrong, for one must break one's promise to at least one of them. Making a clean breast of the whole thing will not be enough to remove one's reprehensibility. The existence of such cases is not morally disturbing, however, because we feel that the situation was not unavoidable: one had to do something wrong in the first place to get into it. But what if the world itself, or someone else's actions, could face a previously innocent person with a choice between morally abominable courses of action, and leave him no way to escape with his honor? Our intuitions rebel at the idea, for we feel that the constructibility of such a case must show a contradiction in our moral views. But it is not in itself a contradiction to say that someone can do X or not do X, and that for him to take either course would be wrong. It merely contradicts the supposition that ought implies can‑since presumably one ought to refrain from what is wrong, and in such a case it is impossible to do so." Given the limitations on human action, it is naive to suppose that there is a solution to every moral problem with which the world can face us. We have always known that the world is a bad place. It appears that it may be an evil place as well.

#### Risking extinction not ethical- precludes ethical behavior

Elliott ‘97

(Herschel, Feb. 26, Emeritus Assoc. Prof. of Philo @ U. of Florida, “A General Statement of the Tragedy of the Commons”, dieoff.org, www.dieoff.org/page121.htm; Jacob)

Specifically, Hardin's thought experiment with an imaginary commons demonstrates the futility -- the absurdity -- of much traditional ethical thinking. The sad fate of the imaginary commons on which people pasture their herds proves that moral principles can be refuted by facts -- the consequences caused when people live by those principles. It shows that if any ethics makes it advantageous for individuals or groups to increase their demands on the biological commons while it forces everyone to share equally the damage which that behavior causes, then the demise of the whole -- the ecosystem which supports that behavior -- is inevitable. Surely such an ethics is absurd. It refutes itself in the sense that it requires or allows ethical behavior which denies the possibility of further ethical behavior.

#### No offense- appealing to consequences inevitable

Richard A. Epstein, James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of Law, University of Chicago, Boston University Law Review, 76 B.U.L. Rev. 1, February / April, 1996

Similarly, on questions of method, I believe that the deontological approach is wrong insofar as it claims that its normative conclusions can be denied only on pain of self-contradiction. Today many writers believe that the protection of individual autonomy is not a primary goal of legal rules, but that, to the contrary, any "natural" distribution of talents is determined largely by luck and hence morally arbitrary. n5 Given this perspective, it follows that legal rules should introduce certain measures of sharing across individuals, if not by forced labor, then by systems of taxation and regulation that redistribute the fruits of individual labor. n6 One can argue against these views, but hardly on the ground that they are self-contradictory, or even that they are morally suspect in their effort to raise [\*3] the level of the least fortunate closer to the level enjoyed by those who have a greater share of natural abilities and endowments. A defense of the older regime of individual liberties and properties cannot rest on a simple assertion that people have rights and that other individuals are not allowed to do actions that violate those rights. n7 One has to show why any given configuration of rights is superior to its rival conceptions, an undertaking that typically requires an appeal to consequences, less for particular cases, and more for some overall assessment of how alternative legal regimes play out in the long run. In a word, one has to become a utilitarian of some stripe to justify rules in terms of the consequences they bring about. n8

#### Specific scenario planning is key to combating larger securitizing structures

Ole Wæver, IR—University of Copenhagen, 2000 International relations theory and the politics of European integration, p. 284-285

The other main possibility is to stress' responsibility. Particularly in a field like security one has to make choices and deal with the challenges and risks that one confronts – and not shy away into long-range or principled trans-formations. The meta political line risks (despite the theoretical commit­ment to the concrete other) implying that politics can be contained within large 'systemic questions. In line with the classical revolutionary tradition, after the change (now no longer the revolution but the meta-physical trans­formation), there will be no more problems whereas in our situation (until the change) we should not deal with the 'small questions' of politics, only with the large one (cf. Rorty 1996). However, the ethical demand in post-structuralism (e.g. Derrida's 'justice') is of a kind that can never be instan­tiated in any concrete political order – It is an experience of the undecidable that exceeds any concrete solution and reinserts politics. Therefore, politics can never be reduced to meta-questions there is no way to erase the small, particular, banal conflicts and controversies. In contrast to the quasi-institutionalist formula of radical democracy which one finds in the 'opening' oriented version of deconstruction, we could with Derrida stress the singularity of the event. To take a position, take part, and 'produce events' (Derrida 1994: 89) means to get involved in specific struggles. Politics takes place 'in the singular event of engage­ment' (Derrida 1996: 83). Derrida's politics is focused on the calls that demand response/responsi­bility contained in words like justice, Europe and emancipation. Should we treat security in this manner? No, security is not that kind of call. 'Security' is not a way to open (or keep open) an ethical horizon. Security is a much more situational concept oriented to the handling of specifics. It belongs to the sphere of how to handle challenges – and avoid 'the worst' (Derrida 1991). Here enters again the possible pessimism which for the security analyst might be occupational or structural. The infinitude of responsibility (Derrida 1996: 86) or the tragic nature of politics (Morgenthau 1946, Chapter 7) means that one can never feel reassured that by some 'good deed', 'I have assumed my responsibilities ' (Derrida 1996: 86). If I conduct myself particularly well with regard to someone, I know that it is to the detriment of an other; of one nation to the detriment of my friends to the detriment of other friends or non-friends, etc. This is the infinitude that inscribes itself within responsibility; otherwise there would he no ethical problems or decisions. (ibid.; and parallel argumentation in Morgenthau 1946; Chapters 6 and 7) Because of this there will remain conflicts and risks - and the question of how to handle them. Should developments be securitized (and if so, in *what* terms)? Often, our reply will be to aim for de-securitization and then politics meet meta-politics; but occasionally the underlying pessimism regarding the prospects for orderliness and compatibility among human aspirations will point to scenarios sufficiently worrisome that responsibility will entail securitization in order to block the worst. As a security/securitization analyst, this means accepting the task of trying to manage and avoid spirals and accelerating security concerns, to try to assist in shaping the continent in a way that creates the least insecurity and violence - even if this occasionally means invoking/producing `structures' or even using the dubious instrument of securitization. In the case of the current European configuration, the above analysis suggests the use of securitization at the level of European scenarios with the aim of pre­empting and avoiding numerous instances of local securitization that could lead to security dilemmas and escalations, violence and mutual vilification.

#### Security dilemmas are real and can’t be eliminated by changing discursive practice – the alternative creates change domestically which leads to more uncertainty internationally reinforcing the worst aspects of a security approach

Copeland 2k Associate Professor in the Department of Government and Foreign Affairs University of Virginia, Fall 2000 (International Security)

Social Theory of International Politics provides an important starting point for further debate and constructivist empirical analysis, but only a starting point. Wendt has not shown that anarchy tied to changing distributions of power has no logic, only that constructivist variables can perhaps, under certain conditions, moderate actors’ level of uncertainty about others’ intentions. Yet constructivism is inherently an argument about how the past shapes the way actors understand their present situation. By its very nature—its focus on historical process—constructivism has trouble analyzing how rational, prudent leaders deal with the pernicious problem of future uncertainty. And this uncertainty is given by the human condition. Human beings are not born with the ability to read the minds of other actors, and they have only limited means for foreseeing the future. Moreover, human beings, as constructivists emphasize, are mutable—they can be changed through interaction. Yet if much of this interaction takes place at the domestic level and is independent of diplomatic interaction, then prudent states must be worried. They know that the other may become aggressive despite all diplomatic efforts to instantiate other-regarding values and to communicate their own nonaggressive intentions. The material distribution of power then becomes critical to their calculations. It represents the other’s potential to do harm in the future. Hence, if power trends are negative, a declining state must worry that the other will turn aggressive after it achieves preponderance, even if it seems peaceful right now. The task ahead lies in testing the propositions that fall out of Wendt’s constructivist argument. In explaining variations in the level of cooperation over the past two millennia, there are three main competing arguments— Wendt’s systemic constructivism, systemic realism, and neoliberalism—to which we could add a fourth, namely, a more domestic constructivist argument (one that shades into unit-level liberalism). Systemic constructivism (or what might be called “neoconstructivism”) focuses on interstate interactions as the source for new, or reproduced, conceptions of self and other, which in turn affect state propensities to fall into conºictual or cooperative behavior. Systemic realism predicts changes in the levels of cooperation based on changes and trends in the distribution of material power over time, set against a baseline of actor uncertainty about the future. Neoliberalism, accepting the neorealist foundation of rational actors worried about the future, stresses the role of institutions as mechanisms that reduce the uncertainty that can lead to conflict. Finally, domestic constructivists and unit-level liberals emphasize changes within particular states that alter aggregated state interests and identities. When domestic processes produce states with motives beyond mere security, we should expect more conflictual behavior, all things being equal. None of these positions needs to reject the causal factors highlighted by the alternative approaches. Indeed, as I have argued, systemic realists recognize the domestic constructivist/liberal point that internal processes can change the nature of the opponent over time, and they use it to show how a system of purely security-seeking states can still fall into conflict and war. But instead of trying to collapse these different theories into one model of “culture,” as Social Theory does, we need to recognize that each of these approaches focuses on separate and often independent causal variables. In this way, we can see that egoistic and militaristic mind-sets are sustained and transformed not only by international interaction, as Wendt claims. They may be, but how often and to what extent is a question for empirical analysis. And because Wendt’s book does not offer such an analysis, the debate is still very much an open one. Sometimes egoism and militarism will be caused by domestic processes alone (e.g., if an aggressive ideology triumphs through revolution). Sometimes they will result from prudent fears of the future, especially during periods of dynamic change in the relative power balance. Sometimes they will reflect a lack of institutional mechanisms for learning about the other state, and thus rational misjudgments about the other’s type. Although the road ahead for Wendt’s neoconstructivism is still long, Social Theory of International Politics provides a solid constructivist vehicle for traveling it. The book allows scholars to differentiate clearly between truly material and ideational explanations, and between accounts that emphasize the role of states as actors and those that incorporate transnational forces and divisions within polities. It has reinforced the importance of diplomacy as a tool for reducing high levels of misunderstanding that can impede cooperation. Yet by bracketing off domestic processes, Wendt has overlooked the irony of constructivism: that the mutability of human ideational structures at the domestic level reinforces leaders’ great uncertainty about future intentions at the interstate level. The security dilemma, with all its implications, is real and pervasive. It cannot be talked away through better discursive practices. It must be faced**.**

### 2NC

#### PIC:

Using the name Bradley isn’t key to clarifying what you’re talking about – it’s a direct, deliberate insult to her extraordinarily clear request.

JOS 13 (writer for Feministing, “The shameful, unacceptable media coverage of Chelsea Manning’s transition”, 8/23/13, http://feministing.com/2013/08/23/the-shameful-unacceptable-media-coverage-of-chelsea-mannings-transition/)

When Chelsea Manning announced yesterday that she is transitioning and wants to be referred to by the name Chelsea and with female pronouns, news organizations scrambled to figure out what to do. Many published articles with bizarre headlines like, ”Manning Says He Is Female and Wants to Lives as a Woman.” Which is ridiculous, because Chelsea made it very clear how to refer to her: “I am Chelsea Manning. I am a female… I also request that, starting today, you refer to me by my new name and use the feminine pronoun.” NBC, ABC, CBS, CNN, the Boston Globe, the New York Daily News, the New York Post, Politico, the Telegraph, Reuters, and the Los Angeles Times all used masculine pronouns (I would typically link to all the articles I’m referencing, but I am not giving away traffic for shitty journalism. I’ve included contact information for these news organizations at the end of this article). The New York Times and the Associated Press used masculine pronouns, and they both have style guides that say you should use the name and pronoun preferred by the subject you’re reporting on. The AP’s standards are too strict – they say to respect the pronouns of people, “who have acquired the physical characteristics of the opposite sex or present themselves in a way that does not correspond with their sex at birth.” Frankly, coming out publicly should count as presenting yourself in a way that doesn’t correspond with your assigned sex. Chelsea has publicly lost her access to maleness, even if folks aren’t respecting her female identity. But also, the AP’s standards should change. The New York Times, on the other hand, has great standards: “Unless a former name is newsworthy or pertinent, use the name and pronouns (he, his, she, her, hers) preferred by the transgender person.” Great standards which The Grey Lady did not follow.¶ Perhaps the most egregious example of disrespecting Chelsea’s name and pronouns comes from USA Today, which, in addition to their shitty coverage, published an article titled “Media torn in Manning ‘he’ or ‘she’ pronoun debate.” The article quotes the publication’s Editor in Chief:¶ “This is a tough one and sparked vigorous debate in the newsroom,” USA TODAY Editor in Chief David Callaway says. “Style evolves with the culture, and the latest style recommendations are that transgender people should be described as they want to be described. That said, Private Manning has been known as a male to this day, so should be regarded as ‘he’ at least for the immediate future. We will continue to discuss.”¶ At least USA Today is being open about the shitty decision the majority of major news organizations are making. Because this is a deliberate, active decision – to disrespect the incredibly clear request Chelsea has made.¶ By far the worst article from a major publication came from The Daily Beast. All of that site’s coverage has been awful, including sensationalist reporting about medical transition. But their article “How Will Chelsea Manning Be Treated in Prison?” by Mansfield Frazier takes the cake. Here’s a link to a mirror of the original article, which I do not recommend clicking. The article denies the existence of much prison rape, is super homophobic and transmisogynist, and says Chelsea might have a great time in prison where she could become the “queen bee.” The Daily Beast added an Editor’s Note to the article saying it was opinion, removed the most obvious homophobia and the reference to there not being much “true” rape in prison. Which did not change the fact that the article is still homophobic, transphobic, and rape denying. Not to mention that it never, ever should have been published in the first place. Part of why I’m so upset about this article is that it’s so bad it’s taking attention away from the fact that almost every single bit of coverage of this story is terrible.¶ Even articles framed around getting this story right have been problematic. Margaret Sullivan, the NYT Public Editor, uses the wrong name and pronoun in an article about how her paper should probably get those things right eventually. Amanda Marcotte uses Chelsea’s old name in an article at Slate’s XXFactor (hello biological essentialism, btw) about getting her name and pronouns right. NPR made their deliberate decision to get Manning’s name wrong public: “NPR, like other news outlets, is at this point continuing to refer to the soldier as ‘Bradley Manning’ on first reference. Manning’s name has not been legally changed.” Um, do you have any idea what a costly, time consuming pain in the ass it is to go through a legal name and gender change? And that’s not even while you’re incarcerated in a men’s prison.¶ I do understand the impetus to mention Manning’s old name at least once so the audience knows what’s being reported on. Personally, I think it’s unnecessary – “Pfc. Manning” should be enough to clue in your audience. Of course, I’m more comfortable with just using Manning or Pfc. Manning because that’s how I’ve been referring to her since 2011. Part of what has annoyed me about the news coverage over the past day is that this is not new information. Chelsea came out publicly, telling us her name and how we should refer to her, which should be more than enough to correct reporters. But she had already been outed through the process of the trial. She’d already said privately she was female, information that then became public. Yet even her supporters continued to default to her given name and masculine pronouns. When I see or hear someone communicate that their gender is different from the one assigned to them at birth, I listen, and I respect that. Most people in this world default to the gender that is coercively assigned to someone at birth. I happen to believe that people know their own genders way better than any outside “expert,” be they a doctor, lawyer, judge, or journalist. And I know how hard it is to go against the gender assigned to you in this transphobic context. It can be particularly hard for women assigned male at birth – the costs of living your actual gender are higher, because patriarchy. When I first read Manning’s words about her gender identity during the process of the trial, I believed her. And I stopped defaulting to her assigned name and masculine pronouns, because I always put self-identification over an identity that’s been coercively assigned to someone. So I didn’t take the announcement yesterday as groundbreaking news – I saw it as Chelsea making clear and public the name and pronouns she wants to use. Which is part of why I’m so disgusted – this announcement is being treated as major news instead of a clarification of how to report on Chelsea.

The affirmative’s Western discourse of naturalization produces homophobia by stabilizing sexuality – the counterplan’s queering of discourse resists this.

Gaard 97 (Greta, educator, writer, scholar and activist working at the intersections of literature, feminism, and environmental justice, ‘Toward A Queer Ecofeminism’, Hypatia. Volume: 12. Issue: 1. Publication Year: 1997. Page Number: 114)

By attempting to "naturalize" sexuality, the dominant discourse of Western culture constructs queer sexualities as "unnatural" and hence subordinate. As Jeffrey Weeks writes in Against Nature, "**appeals to nature, to the claims of the natural, are among the most potent we can make. They place us in a world of apparent fixity and truth.** They appear to tell us what and who we are, and where we are going. They seem to tell us the truth" (1991, 87). Arguments from "nature," as feminist philosophers of science have repeatedly argued, are frequently used to justify social norms rather than to find out anything new about nature ( Bleier 1984; Fausto-Sterling 1985; Hubbard, Henifin, and Fried 1982; Keller 1985; Lowe and Hubbard 1983). Attempts to naturalize one form of sexuality function as attempts to foreclose investigation of sexual diversity and sexual practices and to gain control of the discourse on sexuality. Such attempts are a manifestation of Western culture's homophobia and erotophobia.

Inclusion kills solvency – we have to resist every instance of discursive heteronormativity to prevent our impacts, risk of the net benefit outweighs. Any residual link is enough---must reject doublethink in EVERY instance

Kehl and Livingston 99 [D.G. and Howard, English at Arizona State University and Pace University, July 1999, English Journal 88.6]

Doublespeak is not a frivolous game about humorous euphemisms, such as "sanitation engineer" for one who collects garbage, or "sanitarians" (who "deroach" buildings) for pest exterminators, or "automotive technicians" for car mechanics, or "field service technicians" for repair people. Rather, doublespeak in all too many cases is an insidious practice whereby the powerful abuse language to deceive and manipulate for the purpose of controlling public behavior—the public as consumer, as voter, as student—by depriving us of our right to make informed choices. Before teachers of English at any level are permitted to "practice" in the classroom, we should subscribe to a linguistic equivalent of the Hippocratic Oath, an Orwellian Oath perhaps, whereby we commit to (1) use language clearly and responsibly our selves; (2) combat doublespeak wherever we find it; and (3) seek effective pedagogical ways of making students sensitive to language and aware of linguistic vulnerability in all forms.

Lit checks – we can’t gain offense off of any random word, there has to be a literature base backing it up – solves their limits claims.

**Word PICS are key to education – The aff should have to defend every word in the plan.**

Kehl & Livingston 99 [D.G. & Howard, English at Arizona State University and Pace University, July, English Journal 88.6]

Second, students’ own linguistic vulnerability should be demonstrated in a meaningful and convincing way. How would they react, for example, if while shopping they encounter “vegetarian leather” for plain, cheap vinyl; or “synthetic glass” for plastic; or, in place of down payment, they get “customer capital cost reduction”? ¶ Third, they should be made more sensitive to language and how it works, not just denotation but connotation, concrete versus abstract terms, specific versus general, adjectives as evaluative projections of a speaker or writer, slanted language, and much more. For example, they can be asked to consider how many times in a year they buy something simply on the persuasive appeal of words rather than on the genuine merits of the product, whether that product is sunglasses, clothes, vehicles, or food. Especially illuminating in developing sensitivity to language are exercises that ask students to distinguish differences in connotation among lists of so-called synonyms. For example, which of the following would they like to be called—and why: boy/girl, lad/lassie, kid, young person, youngster, tyke, juvenile, future citizen, Generation X-er, member of the rising generation? Lively discussions can be conducted on the connotative effects of the language of advertising. For example, why are certain words taboo in advertising, requiring the substitution of euphemisms: not “fat” but “full figured,” not “cheap” but “inexpensive,” not “used car” but “preowned automobile,” not “smell” but “aroma.” (A recent example of doublespeak for “stink” is “exceed the olfactory threshold.”) ¶ Fourth, students should be taught not only to read critically but also to speak and write re responsibility Wasn't’it Sir Arthur Quiller-Couch who noted that a writer should be prepared to stand cross-examination on every word? And as for reading critically, perhaps Thomas Carlyle said it best: “If we think of it, all that a university or final highest school can do for us is still but what the first school began doing—teach us to read.” Isn’t that at least a significant part of the English teacher’s job description?

**We access the best internal link to fairness. The idea of letting heterosexual practices continue while shutting out alternative voices is a hypocritical double standard.**

**Slagle 4** (R. Anthony, president of Speech Communication Association of Puerto Rico/PhD in English from Ohio State, 3/10/04 “Queer Criticism and Sexual Normativity: The Case of Pee-wee Herman”, Queer Theory and Communication: From Disciplining Queers to Queering the Discipline, p.134, MH)

**Queer criticism, then, both draws attention to and challenges the notion that sexuality is a private matter that is best left in the bedroom**. For queer critics, **when people suggest that it is inappropriate to discuss issues of sexuality, they are really saying that nonnormative sexualities are inappropriate. The dogmatic insistence upon silence when it comes to queer sexualities does not, i**n practice, **apply to those with normative sexualities. Queer critics draw attention to the fact that heterosexuality is frequently displayed publicly**. Such displays include the fact that heterosexuals are able to walk down the street holding hands, or sit in the park kissing. It **is not unusual to see heterosexuals have photographs of their husbands or wives and children on their desks in the workplace. Marriage is another example of the celebration of normative sexuality– engagements and marriages are typically announced in the newspaper. When queers try to celebrate their relationships in similar ways, they are, at best, accused of making something public that people don’t want to hear about or, at worst, they are accused of trying to destroy the most fundamental institution upon which society is built** (the nuclear family). **Queer critics draw attention to the hypocrisy of such a double standard, and they emphasize that if people were secure in their own sexual roles they would have no reason to feel threatened by sexualities that differ from their own.**

Analyzing discursive heteronormativity in educational settings is critical to social justice – normalizing rhetoric by students silences the queer identity.

Jaekel 13 (Katy Jaekel, Professor of English @ Iowa State University, “Sometimes, It’s Us: Examining the Power in Discourse”, Commission for Social Justice Educators, 3/5/13, http://acpacsje.wordpress.com/2013/03/05/sometimes-its-us-examining-the-power-in-discourse-by-dr-katy-jaekel/)

The second form of resistance, one that surfaces far more often, is discursive resistance. I argue here that we should be examining the discursive forms of resistance just as much as we do the blatant because they are far more widespread and damaging, in part because these comments go unaddressed. I feel social justice educators should shift more of their focus on these discursive comments and use them as a tool to teach about institutional power.¶ To begin, I am defining discursive resistance based on the Foucauldian (1982) definition of discursive formation. According to Foucault, discourse has a larger meaning than simply one person saying something. Rather, discursive formation recognizes that the discourse is mediated by the institution where it is uttered; it is mediated by institutional rules, institutional power hierarchies, and institutional control. Thus, when discursive formations are uttered, they are indicative of how that discourse was formed: it is a marker of a certain meaning that was influenced by a certain power structure. In the end, this discursive formation becomes power and serves as a regulating tool. Essentially, then, the discourse, which is mediated by the institution, serves to (re)produce power inequities.¶ For example, when a white, middle-class male student indicated that he was “fine with gays so long as they don’t throw it up in everyone’s faces,” this form of discursive resistance was uttered as a form of a regulation tool to normalize those around him. While he writes that he is “fine with gay people,” he immediately follows that up with a qualifier: he is only fine with it so long as it is not “in everyone’s face.” This statement indicates that he is fine with those who identify as gay, as long as they do not indicate that they identify as such.¶ This is a form of resistance that I find frightening for two primary reasons. First, this form of resistance is troubling because it has been my experience that course facilitators that I have supervised feel less willing to call this student out because, after all, he did indicate that he was “fine with gays.” Honestly, sometimes instructors that I spoke with felt that being “fine with gays” was half the battle. Secondly, I find this type of resistance concerning because the program administration, myself included, did not equip our course facilitators with tools to get the student to recognize that his discourse was mediated by a larger Discourse around normalization and power. This student had the power, socially and institutionally, to utter something like this and attempt to normalize the “gays.” This, in turn, created a situation where the dominant student, whose discourse was mediated by the larger institution, used his privilege to (re)produce hegemonic power by attempting to make “gays” not be “in everyone’s face,” thus silencing or making invisible a community.

**Extend the 1NC Bevir evidence – we must critically analyze discursive forms of normalization in order to break down heteronormative power structures. All power regimes are fundamentally based in knowledge regimes supported by individual discourse – we need to resist self-policing via our language to effectuate any actual change.**

Analyzing of sexual discourse is crucial to delegitimizing heterosexist authority.

Halperin 95 David M. Halperin, American theorist in the fields of gender studies, queer theory, critical theory, material culture and visual culture, "Sain Foucault: Towards a Gay Hagiography, " New York Oxford University Press, pg. 30-31, 1995

There are doubtless many other factors that may explain the over determined appeal for gay activists of Foucault in general and The History of Sexuality, Volume I, in particular. For the purpose of this essay, however, I want to concentrate on only one motive for the gay-militant appropriation of Foucault. I believe that Foucault's political approach to discourse, specifically his inquiry into what might be called the political economy of sexual discourse, 34 enables us to devise some effective strategies for confronting and resisting the discursive operations of contemporary homophobia. For one thing, Foucault's example teaches us to analyze discourse strategically, not in terms of what it says but in terms of what it does and how it works. That does not mean that we learn from Foucault to treat the content of particular discourses as uninteresting or irrelevant (after all, one has to understand what discourses say in order to be able to analyze what they do and how they work); it does mean that we learn from him not to allow the truth or falsity of particular propositions to distract us from the power-effects they produce or the manner in which they are deployed within particular systems of discursive and institutional practice. 35 The effect of Foucault's political approach to discourse is not to collapse truth into power but to shift the focus of our attention from matters of truth to matters of power. 36 That shift has proven extremely profitable for the analysis of homophobic discourse; 37 it has also proven crucial for the larger projects of delegitimating heterosexist authority and empowering gay practices of knowledge and community. I shall take up each of these three points in turn.

A critique and change of our language is essential to performing agency. Using different language and description is itself resistance.

Bleiker 2K Ph.D. visiting research and teaching affiliations at Harvard, Cambridge, Humboldt, Tampere, Yonsei and Pusan National University as well as the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology and the Institute of Social Studies in The Hague,(Roland, Popular Dissent, Human Agency and Global Politics, Cambridge University Press)

Language penetrates all aspects of transversal struggles. Whatever we think and do is framed by the language within which these acts are carried out. Hence, an engagement with the philosophy of language must be part of an adequate approach to questions of agency in global politics, especially if this approach rests upon a view of human life as constituted by self-understanding. [40](http://www.questia.com/reader/action/prev/105471107#40) From such a vantage point language must be seen not as an image of the world or a way of representing realities, but, as Wittgenstein's famous dictum holds, as 'part of an activity, a way of life'. [41](http://www.questia.com/reader/action/prev/105471107#41) This position has farreaching consequences. If language expresses a particular way of life it is also responsible, at least in part, for the constitution of this way of life. Human agency cannot take place outside language, in some pre- or extra-linguistic realm. It can only take place through language. Expressed differently: languages are not just frameworks to assess actions. They are themselves forms of action. There are, of course, countless domains in which language interferes with transversal struggles. We live at a time when ever-increasing communicative capabilities account for an ever-shrinking globe. Moreover, transversal politics revolves not only around interactions between various national languages, but also between different types of speech. When a liberal, a realist, a defence technician or a peace movement member describes the same event, they use very different languages to interpret the realities they see. Each of these languages has its own set of rules. Each embodies a world-view that implicitly promotes certain social values and certain political, ethical and spatial perceptions of global politics. The clash between these forms of speech is the domain where domination and resistance is carried out. It is the process that engenders human agency.

Specifically, language shapes sexual identities, making it critical to resolve our impacts.

Ritchie & Barker 06, Southampton Solent University & London South Bank University (Ani & Meg, ‘There aren’t words for what we do or how we feel so we have to make them up’: constructing polymorous languages in culture of compulsory monogamy’,SAGE Publications)

The social constructionist approach to sexuality is grounded in the belief that our identity, desires, relationships and emotions are shaped by the culture in which we live (Weeks, 2003). We come to understand ourselves in terms of the concepts that are available to us in the time and place we live in. **The language around us shapes our self-identities** (Burr, 1995**) and our understanding of sexual identity depends on the language of sexuality available to us. The language and everyday experience of sexuality are thus intrinsically linked** (Weeks, 2003). There is a wealth of literature considering how people of non-heterosexual sexualities have developed their own languages to express their identities and experiences and to claim community, rights and recognition. For example, Weeks (2003) argues that the emergence of the label 'gay' in the early 1970s was important in terms of the public expression of homosexuality as a legitimate sexual identity. It established a clear social identity, which offered a previously unavailable sense of security and community, although such categorization may also be seen as restricting and inhibiting (Plummer, 1980). **The reclamation of the term 'queer' by some may offer a move away from fixed sexual identities** (Jagose, 1997). **It seems that the existing language of sexual identity may shape our experiences but that people and communities also invent, alter and reclaim language in order to fit experiences for which there is no existing language**.

Discussion of sexuality is not second to poverty, war, or epidemics, but magnified by these conditions requiring a serious investigation of internal politics, inequities and modes of oppression

Rubin 93 (Gayle S., Professor of Anthropology @ UMich, "Thinking Sex: Notes for a Radical Theory of the Politics of Sexuality," Social Perspective in Lesbian and Gay Studies, NY Routledge)

The time has come to think about sex. To some, sexuality may seem to be an unimportant topic, a frivolous diversion from the more critical problems of poverty, war, disease, racism, famine, or nuclear annihilation. But it is precisely at times such as these, when we live with the possibility of unthinkable destruction, that people are likely to become dangerously crazy about sexuality. Contemporary conflicts over sexual values and erotic conduct have much in common with the religious disputes of earlier centuries. They acquire immense symbolic weight. Disputes over sexual behavior often become the vehicles for displacing social anxieties, and discharging their attendant emotional intensity. Consequently, sexuality should be treated with special respect in times of great social stress. ¶ The realm of sexuality also has its own internal politics, inequities, and modes of oppression. As with other aspects of human behavior, the concrete institutional forms of sexuality at any given time and place are products of human activity. They are imbued with conflicts of interest and political maneuvering, both deliberate and incidental. In that sense, sex is always political. But there are also historical periods in which sexuality is more sharply contested and more overtly politicized. In such periods, the domain of erotic life is, in effect, renegotiated.

#### FRAMEWORK:

#### Absent questions of engagement with existing institutions their aff is useless – individual change is overshadowed by dominant structures

Wight – Professor of IR @ University of Sydney – 6

(Colin, Agents, Structures and International Relations: Politics as Ontology, pgs. 48-50

One important aspect of this relational ontology is that these relations constitute our identity as social actors. According to this relational model of societies, one is what one is, by virtue of the relations within which one is embedded. A worker is only a worker by virtue of his/her relationship to his/her employer and vice versa. ‘Our social being is constituted by relations and our social acts presuppose them.’ At any particular moment in time an individual may be implicated in all manner of relations, each exerting its own peculiar causal effects. This ‘lattice-work’ of relations constitutes the structure of particular societies and endures despite changes in the individuals occupying them. Thus, the relations, the structures, are ontologically distinct from the individuals who enter into them. At a minimum, the social sciences are concerned with two distinct, although mutually interdependent, strata. There is an ontological difference between people and structures: ‘people are not relations, societies are not conscious agents’. Any attempt to explain one in terms of the other should be rejected. If there is an ontological difference between society and people, however, we need to elaborate on the relationship between them. Bhaskar argues that we need a system of mediating concepts, encompassing both aspects of the duality of praxis into which active subjects must fit in order to reproduce it: that is, a system of concepts designating the ‘point of contact’ between human agency and social structures. This is known as a ‘positioned practice’ system. In many respects, the idea of ‘positioned practice’ is very similar to Pierre Bourdieu’s notion of *habitus*. Bourdieu is primarily concerned with what individuals do in their daily lives. He is keen to refute the idea that social activity can be understood solely in terms of individual decision-making, or as determined by surpa-individual objective structures. Bourdieu’s notion of the *habitus* can be viewed as a bridge-building exercise across the explanatory gap between two extremes. Importantly, the notion of a habitus can only be understood in relation to the concept of a ‘social field’. According to Bourdieu, a social field is ‘a network, or a configuration, of objective relations between positions objectively defined’. A social field, then, refers to a structured system of social positions occupied by individuals and/or institutions – the nature of which defines the situation for their occupants. This is a social field whose form is constituted in terms of the relations which define it as a field of a certain type. A *habitus* (positioned practices) is a mediating link between individuals’ subjective worlds and the socio-cultural world into which they are born and which they share with others. The power of the habitus derives from the thoughtlessness of habit and habituation, rather than consciously learned rules. The habitus is imprinted and encoded in a socializing process that commences during early childhood. It is inculcated more by experience than by explicit teaching. Socially competent performances are produced as a matter of routine, without explicit reference to a body of codified knowledge, and without the actors necessarily knowing what they are doing (in the sense of being able adequately to explain what they are doing). As such, the *habitus* can be seen as the site of ‘internalization of reality and the externalization of internality.’ Thus social practices are produced in, and by, the encounter between: (1) the *habitus* and its dispositions; (2) the constraints and demands of the socio-cultural field to which the habitus is appropriate or within; and (3) the dispositions of the individual agents located within both the socio-cultural field and the *habitus*. When placed within Bhaskar’s stratified complex social ontology the model we have is as depicted in Figure 1. The explanation of practices will require all three levels. Society, as field of relations, exists prior to, and is independent of, individual and collective understandings at any particular moment in time; that is, social action requires the conditions for action. Likewise, given that behavior is seemingly recurrent, patterned, ordered, institutionalised, and displays a degree of stability over time, there must be sets of relations and rules that govern it. Contrary to individualist theory, these relations, rules and roles are not dependent upon either knowledge of them by particular individuals, or the existence of actions by particular individuals; that is, their explanation cannot be reduced to consciousness or to the attributes of individuals. These emergent social forms must possess emergent powers. This leads on to arguments for the reality of society based on a causal criterion. Society, as opposed to the individuals that constitute it, is, as Foucault has put it, ‘a complex and independent reality that has its own laws and mechanisms of reaction, its regulations as well as its possibility of disturbance. This new reality is society…It becomes necessary to reflect upon it, upon its specific characteristics, its constants and its variables’.

### 1NR

#### OCOs key to deterrence and overall cyber defense – must keep the options on the table

Limnéll 13

Jarno, director of cyber security at Stonesoft, “Offensive Cyber Capabilities are Needed Because of Deterrence,” The Fog of Cyber Defence, National Defence University Dept. of Leadership and Military Pedagogy, Publican Series 2, Article Collection no 10, Jari Rantapelkonen & Mirva Salminen, ed

Offensive Weaponry is Required for Credibility and Deterrence¶ Discussion on offensive cyber weaponry should begin. As emphasized, currently there is no credible status for the armed forces and the nation states without cyber capabilities – this includes the offensive capability. The arms race is on and accelerating, even if we would like to turn a blind eye to it. The most frantic contemporary race is about talented individuals. When it comes to the creation of cyber capabilities, the question is not about the number of people one employs but about the talent the employed have. The US, China, Russia and many other countries are actively recruiting promising hackers. So are, most likely, Al Qaeda and other organizations. The real cyber question is about the talent and about creating cyber capabilities with the help of the most talented individuals.¶ It is not very popular or even desirable to talk publicly about offensive cyber weaponry in most countries. However, it has become necessary to explain the logic of offensive cyber capabilities to the general public. Naturally, this has to be done in various ways in different countries due to cultural and national reasons. The reasons why countries are developing offensive weapons and why they need them can be summarized into the following four points.¶ First, if one wishes to be a credible actor both in the military battlefield and in world politics, one must have offensive capabilities – as one must have defensive capabilities and the ability to be resilient. One simply cannot have a credible cyber defence without offensive abilities.¶ Second, in order to achieve and raise her deterrence, one must possess offensive capabilities. The ability to act offensively includes a strong preventive message to the others – provided that they understand it and believe it. Offensive capabilities represent the key component of deterrence.¶ Third, offensive thinking and building offensive weaponry are vital in order to create a strong and credible defence. With just “defence thinking” one will not succeed. One has to have an understanding of how the attacker acts, and one should try to find all possible vulnerabilities in her own defence. It is also a matter of developing one’s defensive potentials, testing the current defence and training one’s forces. All this becomes much more efficient if one can test it with her own capabilities. Without the ability to act as an attacker, no country can build an effective and credible cyber defence.

#### Cyberattacks key to joint operation – external from deterrence

Lorber 13, JD candidate at UPenn and PhD candidate at Duke

(Eric, "EXECUTIVE WARMAKING AUTHORITY AND OFFENSIVE CYBER OPERATIONS: CAN EXISTING LEGISLATION SUCCESSFULLY CONSTRAIN PRESIDENTIAL POWER?" Journal of Constitutional Law, Vol 15:3, January 2013, https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/1773-lorber15upajconstl9612013\*\*we do not endorse gendered language\*\*

Hypothetically, scholars and practitioners have postulated a number of ways in which states might use cyberattacks in future combat scenarios, depending on a wide range of factors.103 This process of categorization is not novel, as U.S. military planners have attempted to produce useful typologies since the mid-1990s.104 While many potential categorization schemas exist, and many involve different types of adversaries, vulnerabilities, technologies underpinning the attacks, etc., most seem to focus on a primary element: the relationship of the cyberattack to other operations. In particular, the schemas differentiate based on whether the attack is part of a larger, kinetic offensive, or simply an attack launched independently of such operations. For example, Gregory Rattray and Jason Healey, in their recent work, suggest multiple ways in which a state could launch such an attack, but underpinning each is a discussion of whether the attack is part of a larger military operation or conducted independently.105 Likewise, William Owens, Kenneth Dam, and Herbert Lin differentiate between types of cyberattacks that directly support or are in conjunction with military operations,106 and those conducted independently as covert action.107 Further, the distinction between cyberattacks launched independently as opposed to part of a larger operation properly characterizes most known cyber operations to date. On the one hand, states have launched a number of attacks in recent years independent of kinetic operations.108 For example, the actions in Estonia in 2007—though potentially linked to the Russian government—were independent of any larger military assault.109 More notably, the Stuxnet virus, which inflicted tremendous damage on the Iranian nuclear energy program by destroying its centrifuge cascades and much of its Uranium enrichment capability, was launched independent of military action.110 Though no nation has taken responsibility for the virus, most analysts suggest that Israel, with the United States’ help, designed and deployed the virus to hinder Iran’s nuclear development.111 On the other hand, because cyberattacks may make kinetic operations more effective, states have recently employed the two in conjunction.112 For example, the alleged Israeli attack on Syria in 2007113—as well as the alleged Russian attack on Georgia in 2008114—both employed cyberattacks in conjunction with larger operations. In addition, U.S. war planning for Libya also included a cyber component, but only as part of a larger intervention.115